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RETHINKING THE ROLE OF NONSTATE ACTORS IN
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE

Jason MacLean
What is currently lacking is sufficient political and business leadership.
- The Global Commission on the Economy and Climate'
Look, everything is political.
2
- Anne-Marie Leroy, Former World Bank General Counsel
I.

Introduction

Climate governance is at a crossroads. While climate science is settled and
unequivocal that rapid, systemic, and unprecedented changes in how governments, industries, and societies operate are required to limit climate change to
1.5°C, climate governance grows more and more fragmented. In the wake of
failed international climate treatymaking efforts, from Kyoto to Copenhagen toit now appears-Paris, climate governance scholars and practitioners are investing their efforts and hopes in the potential of nonstate climate actions. The era of
"megamultilateral" climate treatymaking is over; the era of nonstate climate leadership from corporations, cities, provinces, and NGOs is in full swing. The signal
moment in this new climate governance movement may have been the reaction to
U.S. President Donald Trump's announcement that the United States would formally withdraw from the U.N. Paris Agreement on climate change. Former California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger remarked: "When Trump backs out, it
doesn't mean anything. Cities4Climate [a global partnership to bring about
change at the local and regional level] will pick up the slack and lead the clean
energy revolution."' 3 Former mayor of New York City Michael Bloomberg responded with what has become 4the unofficial mantra of this movement: "Nonstate actors are driving the bus."
Nonstate actors, their champions argue, have a number of advantages over
their national government counterparts. Nonstate actors represent a broader array
of resources, perspectives, and expertise than states. Nonstate actors (with the
important exception of subnational actors, including prominent examples like the
U.S. state of California or New York City) are at least one step removed from
I

HELEN MOUNTFORD ET AL., UNLOCKING rHE INCLUSIVE GROWTH STORY OF THE 21ST CENTURY:

ACCELERATING CiLIMATE ACTION IN URGENT TIMES, at 16 (2018), https://newclimateeconomy.report/

2018/.
2 Quoted in Dimitri Van Den Meerssche, Scholars in Self-Estrangement (Again): Rethinking the
Law of International Organizations,5 LONDON REV. INT'L L. 455, 457 (2017).
3 Quoted in Joydeep Gupta & Soumya Sarkar, 'Non-State Actors Are Driving the Bus': The Role of
the US at COP23, THETHIRDPOLE.NE- (Nov. 15, 2017), https://www.thethirdpole.net/en/2017/11/15/nonstate-actors-are-driving-the-bus-the-role-of-the-us-at-cop23/.
4

Id.
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elected political officials and the four-to-five-year electoral cycle. Nonstate actors are far more numerous, and by virtue of their numbers they can enhance the
potential for new channels of collaboration at multiple levels of climate
5
governance.
But do nonstate actors actually have the capacity to fill the leadership gap in
climate mitigation left by national governments at both the scale and pace of
change required? Are nonstate actors immune from the barriers to effective climate action faced by national governments? Are nonstate actors insulated from
politics? This paper critically examines the capacity of nonstate actors to "drive
the bus" toward effective and expeditious global climate governance.
The paper unfolds as follows. First, is describes the "ambition gap" embedded
in the U.N. Paris Agreement 6 and the role assigned to nonstate actors in particular in meeting the Agreement's aspirations. The paper proceeds by assessing the
post-Paris climate governance landscape through the critically-important prism of
capacity. In doing so, the paper also asks how we arrived at this juncture, and
whether we might have lost our way. The paper concludes by arguing that while
the post-Paris climate governance era does indeed call for an "all hands on deck"
approach, state and nonstate actors alike must address and counter the special
interests and political influence of the fossil fuels industry in order to create an
enabling climate policy environment.
II.

Mind the Gap! Nonstate Actors and the Paris Agreement

The most remarkable feature of the Paris Agreement is its explicit acknowledgement of its own ambition gap. The Paris Conference of the Parties (COP)
Decision "[n]otes with concern that the estimated aggregate greenhouse gas
emissions levels in 2025 and 2030 resulting from the intended nationally determined contributions do not fall within the least-cost 2°C scenarios but rather lead
to a projected level of 55 gigatonnes in 2030."' 7 The Paris COP Decision further
notes "that much greater emission reduction efforts will be required than those
associated with the intended nationally determined contributions in order to hold
the increase in the global average temperature to below 2°C above pre-industrial
levels." 8 Specifically, GHG emissions must be reduced to 40 gigatonnes by the
year 2030 in order to meet the Paris Agreement's goal of limiting global warm5 See, e.g., Kenneth Shockley & Idil Boran, With Waning US Leadership on Climate, Nonstate
Actors to Play Outsize Role, THt CONVIRSATION (Nov. 23, 2016), https://theconversation.com/with-waning-us-leadership-on-climate-nonstate-actors-to-play-outsize-role-68946.
6 The phrase "Paris Agreement" is used throughout this paper to refer collectively to the Paris Conference of the Parties (COP) Decision and the Paris Agreement; the latter was adopted in Paris as an
Annex to the Paris COP Decision, but it became a separate, legally binding agreement when ratified by at
least 55 parties accounting for at least an estimated 55% of total global GHG emissions. See Report of the
Conference of the Partieson its Twenty-First Session, Held in Partiesfrom 30 November to 13 December 2015, COP Dec. I/CP.21, Doc. FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add. 1, at 21-36 (Jan. 29, 2016), http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2015/cop2 l/eng/lOaOl.pdf.
7 Id. at T 17 (emphasis original).
8 Id.
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ing to well below 2°C (or 3.6 degrees Fahrenheit) above the pre-industrial norm. 9
This initial "ambition gap" embedded in the Paris Agreement is 15 gigatonnes of
GHG emissions. Another way of expressing this gap is to observe that the set of
individually determined national contributions (INDCs) filed at or before the
conclusion of the Paris Agreement, which represented 95 percent of global GHG
emissions in 2015, put collective efforts on a path to an approximately 3°C temperature increase.' 0
To close this gap between the initial GHG emissions-reduction commitments
(INDCs) made by the parties and the Agreement's well-below 2'C target, an
initial analysis concluded "[s]ubstantial enhancement or over-delivery on current
INDCs by additional national, sub-national and non-state actions is required"."
Before proceeding to discuss this call for greater climate action, particularly at
the subnational and nonstate levels, it is important to first observe two qualifications about the Paris Agreement's initial GHG emissions-reduction commitments
and the Agreement's well-below 2°C target, respectively.
Regarding the initial commitments, the projection that they collectively place
the world on a path to a minimum of 3°C warming above the pre-industrial norm
is based on the tenuous assumption that all of those initial pledges will actually
be met by the Agreement's parties; if they are not, which appears likely, then the
projected temperature increase would not be limited to 3°C, and might reach 4°C.
Regarding the target itself, initial climate analyses following the conclusion of
the Paris Agreement warned that the 2°C target itself should not be confused with
a safe level of warming. According to climate scientist James Hansen and his
colleagues, 2°C of warming above the pre-industrial norm should be considered
"dangerous."12
Taken together, these qualifications help contextualize the findings of the3
United Nations Environment Programme's (UNEP) 2017 emissions gap report.'
According to the UNEP report, the pledges made by parties to the Paris Agreement would-if actually met-bring about only one third of the emissions reduc14
tions required to meet the Agreement's well-below 2°C target. A separate but
contemporaneous analysis conducted by the nongovernmental organization Climate Action Tracker concluded that no major industrialized state was on pace to
5
meet its initial pledge under the Agreement.1
9 Id.

10 Jennifer Allan et al., Summary of the Paris Climate Change Conference: 29 November - 13 December 2015, EARTH

NEoTIATIONS

BULL.,

Dec. 15,

2015, at 44, enb.iisd.org/download/pdf/enb

12663e.pdf.
11 Joeri Rogelj et al., Paris Agreement Climate Proposals Need a Boost to Keep Warming Well
Below 2'C, 534 NATURE 631, 631 (2016).
12 James Hansen et al., Ice Melt, Sea Level Rise and Superstorms: Evidence from Paleoclimate Data,
Climate Modeling, and Modern Observations that 2'C Global Warming Could Be Dangerous, 16 ATMOSPHERIC CHEMISTRY & PHYSICS 3761, 3801 (2016).

13 UNEP, The Emissions Gap Report 2017: A UN Environment Synthesis Report, (Nov. 2017), https:/
/www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report-2017.
14 Id. at xiii.
15 Hanna Fekete et al., Improvement in Warming Outlook as India and China Move Ahead, but Paris
Agreement Gap Still Looms Large, CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER (Nov. 15, 2017), https://climateaction
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These discouraging data-made worse by the United States' decision to withdraw from the Paris Agreement-have amplified calls for nonstate actors to play,
not merely a more significant role, but a leading role in addressing climate
change. 16 The argument that corporations, cities, and state and provincial governments "must help to drive the ambition of national governments on climate
change, particularly through smart infrastructure and transport policy" 17 is representative of this increasingly urgent call. So too is the claim that the public engagement of "eminent scientists, business leaders, economists, analysts,
influencers and representatives of non-governmental organizations, is an example
of the strength of radical collaboration across unusual partners." 18
Daunting as the challenge of meeting the Paris Agreement's well-below 2°C
target doubtless is, the international climate action landscape changed dramatically following the release of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change's (IPCC) special report on global warming of 1.5'C.19 The IPCC's report
responds to the invitation of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) to the IPCC's three climate science working groups to
examine the impacts of global warming above the more aspirational of the Paris
Agreement's two climate targets, 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels. The resulting
report was authored by 91 researchers from 44 countries, and consists of a review
of over 6,000 peer-reviewed studies and 40,000 reviewer comments. 20 The report
expresses "high confidence" in a "robust difference" between a world of 1.5°C
warming and a world of 2°C warming. 2 ' Warming of 1.5°C will produce a
greater number of severe heat waves and more extreme storms, flooding, and
forest fires, which is notable given the increasing extreme weather events we are
22
already witnessing.
Warming above 1.5°C, however, is truly alarming. Approximately ten million
people will be exposed to permanent inundation, and hundreds of millions more
will be susceptible to climate-related poverty. 23 Malaria and dengue fever will
increase, while maize, rice, and wheat crop yields will decline. 24 At 2 0 C of
warming, the consequences are graver. Approximately 18% of insects, 16% of
tracker.org/publications/improvement-warming-outlook-india-and-china-move-ahead-paris-agreementgap-still-looms-large/.
16 See, e.g., Subnationals, Non-state Actors Are Crucialfor Paris Success, UN FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Oct. 20, 2017), https://unfccc.int/news/subnationals-non-state-actors-are-

crucial-for-paris-success. See generally, Thomas Hale, 'All Hands on Deck': The ParisAgreement and
Nonstate Climate Action, 16 GLOBAL ENVTL. POL. 12, 12 (2016).
17 Christiana Figueres, Three Years to Safeguard Our Climate, 546 NATURE 593, 595 (2017).
18 Id.

19 IPCC, Global Warming of 1.5°C: Summary for Policymakers, Doc. SR1.5 (Oct. 6, 2018), http:l/
www.ipcc.ch/report/srl 5/.
20 IPCC, IPCC Press Release, Doc. 2018/24/PR (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/up
loads/2018/ 1/pr._l81008_P48_spmen.pdf.
21 lPCC Doc. SR1.5, supra note 19, B1, at 9.
22 See, e.g., Natural Disasters Videos, N.Y. TwrEs, https://www.nytimes.com/video/natural-disasters.
23 IPCC Doc. SR1.5, supra note 19,

B5.1, at 11.

24 Id. I B5.2, at 11.
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plants, and 8% of vertebrates will lose their habitats. 25 The global annual catch
from marine fisheries will decline by 3 million tonnes. 26 Nearly all (99%) of
coral reefs will die off.2 7 The cri de coeur of the climate-threatened Alliance2 8 of
Small Island States-"1.5 to stay alive"-is now a global scientific truism.
The implications of these findings for GHG emissions pathways are just as
startling. Not only does the IPCC estimate that limiting warming to 1.5°C will
require far higher carbon prices than are presently in place (by 2030, the global
average price must be three to four times higher, or US$135 to US$5,500 per
tonne),2 9 but it also concluded that rapid, unprecedented, and systemic changes in
how governments, industries, and societies function are necessary. 30 With renewed urgency, the IPCC calls for an "all hands on deck" approach by concluding that "[s]trengthening the capacities for climate action of national and subnational authorities, civil society, the private sector, indigenous peoples and local
communities can support the implementation of ambitious actions implied by
limiting global warming to 1.50 C. ' ' 31 In particular, the IPCC recommends partnerships "involving non-state public and private actors, international investors,
the banking system, civil society and scientific institutions" to meet the 1.5°C
target. 32
More daunting still, further delay is no longer an option. The world has already experienced an average temperature increase of as much as 1.2°C. 33 The
current rate of extracting and combusting fossil fuels risks global warming of 4°C •
by the end of the century, if not sooner. 34 To prevent this calamity, the IPCC
reports that the world must reduce global GHG emissions by 45% from 2010
levels by 2030, and achieve net-zero emissions by 2050. "The next few years,"
argues Debra Roberts, co-chair of the IPCC's working group on climate impacts,
adaptation, and vulnerabilities, "are probably the most important in our
history.'35

While the IPCC's findings with respect to 1.5°C of warming are perhaps surprising, the claim that nonstate actors must assume a leadership role in global
25 Id.I B3.1, at 10.
26 Id.I B4.4, at 11.
27 Id. B4.2, at

10.

28 Id.I B5.1, at 9.
29 IPCC Doc. SR1.5, supra note 19,

C2.6-C2.7, at 18.

30 Id. I C2, at 17.
31 Id. D7, at 25.
32 Id.I D7.1, at 25.
33 Press Release, World Meteorological Org., Provisional WMO Statement on the Status of the
Global Climate in 2016 (Nov. 14, 2016), https://public.wmo.int/en/media/press-release/provisional-wmostatement-status-of-global-climate-2016.
34 See Ottmar Edenhofer & Johan Rockstrdm, Charge 30 a Tonne for C02 to Avoid Catastrophic4C
Warming, THF GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/05/charge30-a-tonne-for-co2-to-avoid-catastrophic-4c-warming.
35 Carolyn Kormann, The Dire Warnings of the United Nations' Latest Climate-ChangeReport, N~w
YORK R (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-dire-wamings-of-the-unitednations-latest-climate-change-report.
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climate governance is by now familiar, even taken for granted among international climate policy scholars and observers-indeed, one observer has gone so
far as to claim that "minilateralism" has become the "conventional wisdom" for
addressing climate change in developed countries. 36 The traditional approach to
global climate governance, multilateral treatymaking dominated by states, has
thus far failed to adequately address the problem. Over the last 10-15 years, as
the failures of state-focused multilateralism became increasingly clear, new and
experimental approaches have proliferated. Nonstate actors and initiatives have
been at the forefront of this alternative approach, which no longer has either a
37
single focus or locus.
This climate governance shift is evident in-but not limited to-the Paris
Agreement itself. The Agreement's structure reflects the burgeoning efforts of
nongovernmental organizations, business groups, civil society, think tanks, trade
unions, independent media organizations, private governance arrangements,
transnational networks, academic researchers, and subnational authorities to address global climate change. 38 Nonstate actors play a number of formal and informal roles in the Agreement. They monitor states' progress toward their
commitments, and by doing so they increase the transparency of states' levels of
compliance as well as facilitate, at least in theory, the ratcheting-up of states'
policy ambitions. By registering their own climate commitments, initiatives, and
actions in the Non-State Actor Zone for Climate Action (NAZCA) platform attached to the Paris Agreement under the auspices of the UNFCC, nonstate actors
are attempting to play a variety of governance roles, from undertaking independent GHG reduction commitments, to partnering in multi-level governance arrangements, to experimenting with ways to scale-up their initiatives at broader
levels of governance. 39 Under the closely related Global Climate Action Agenda
(GCCA), or what is called the "fourth pillar" of the Paris Agreement (alongside
national pledges, the Agreement's financing package, and the negotiated agreement itself), nonstate climate actions across 12 thematic fields are showcased by
the UNFCC. 40 The importance of these nonstate commitments is reflected in the
text of the Paris Agreement itself. 41
36 David Roberts, A Way to Win the Climate Fight, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (May 10, 2011), https:/

/prospect.org/article/way-win-climate-fight.
37 Sander Chan et Al., Reinvigorating InternationalClimate Policy: A Comprehensive Frameworkfor
Effective Nonstate Action, 6 GLOBAL PoL'Y 466, 466 (2015). See also DAViD G. VICTOR, G.OBAL
WARMING GRIDLOCK: CREATING MoRE EFFiEiCTIVE STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE PLANET (2011);
MATTHEW J. HOFFMAN, CLIMATE GOVERNANCE

AT THE CROSSROADS: EXPERIMENTING WITH A GLOBAL

(2011).
38 Jonathan W. Kuyper, Bj6m-Ola Linn6r & Heike Schroeder, Non-state Actors in Hybrid Global

RESPONSE AFTER KYOTO

Climate Governance: Justice, Legitimacy, and Effectiveness in a Post-Paris Era, 9 WIRES CLIMATE
CHANGE 1, 18 (2018).

39 As of this writing (November 12, 2018), over 12,000 (12,293) nonstate stakeholders have registered over 19,000 (19,823) actions. For up-to-date information, see NAZCA's online portal: Database of
Stakeholder Actions, NAZCA GLOBAL CLIMATE ACTION, http://climateaction.unfccc.int/views/total-actions.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
40 Latest Climate Action News, UNFCC, https://unfccc.int/climate-action (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
41 Paris Agreement, IT 117- 118 (mandating the continuation of the NAZCA), and
133-136 (welcoming and encouraging all non-party stakeholders).
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Even more important, however, is the broader and increasingly diverse landscape of nonstate climate governance in the now post-Paris era. It is now taken
for granted that nonstate actors are intimately involved in international climate
governance. 42 The question is whether nonstate actors-particularly subnational
governments and corporations-are capable of assuming an effective leadership
role in international-cum-global environmental governance, and if so, how? The
next section of this paper offers a critical account of the post-Paris climate governance landscape through the prism of the critically-important concept of capacity. In doing so, it also asks how we got here, and whether we might have lost our
way.

IH.

Who's Driving this Bus? Enhanced Climate Action Before (2020)

2030
The world is in a desperate race between accelerating climate change and the
innovation needed to cut emissions before it's too late. Cities, states, and businesses are in the lead, but they face stiff headwindsfrom weak national policies
and the continued efforts of fossil fuel interests to undermine the innovation we
need.
43
John Sterman, MIT Systems Dynamics Group Leader
The number of nonstate and subnational climate commitments and initiatives
has grown steadily in the post-Paris Agreement era. These commitments and initiatives are being made by municipalities, subnational states, provinces, and regions, and companies, and also include climate action networks and international
cooperative initiatives. Examples include: (1) America's Pledge; 44 (2) C40 Cities
for Climate Leadership Group; 4 5 (3) ICLEI Local Governments for Sustainability
carbonn Climate Registry; 4 6 (4) Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP);4 7 (5) Compact
of States and Regions; 48 (6) European Union Covenant of Mayors; 49 (7) Global
42

See, e.g., Jos6 Enrique Alvarez, THE

IMPACT OF INTERNATIONAL

ORGANIZATIONS ON INTERNA-

TIONA LAW (Brill Nijhoff 2016); Guy Fit Sinclair, To REFORM THE WORLD: INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN STA[ES (Oxford University Press 2017) (This growth on nonstate

action in international climate governance mirrors the growth of nonstate actions on the part of international organizations and nongovernmental organizations in international law-making more generally).
43 Oliver Milman, Climate Change: Local Efforts Won't Be Enough to Undo Trump's Inaction, Study
Says, THE GUARDIAN (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/aug/29/local-climate-efforts-wont-undo-trump-inaction.
44 Overview, AMERICA'S PLEDGE, https://www.americaspledgeonclimate.com/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2019).
45 C40 CITIES, https://www.c40.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
46 CARBONN CLIMATE REGISTRY, https://carbonn.org/ (last visited Jan. l1, 2019).
47 CARBON DISCLOSURE PROJECT, https://www.cdp.net/en (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
48 Compact of States and Regions - Subnational Initiatives Driving Climate Ambition, UNFCC (Sept.
1, 2015), https://unfccc.int/news/compact-of-states-and-regions-subnational-initiatives-driving-climateambition.
49 EUROPEAN UNION COVENANT OF MAYORS, https://www.covenantofmayors.eu/ (last visited Jan. 11,
2019).
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Covenant of Mayors for Climate and Energy; 50 (7) the UNFCC NAZCA an
GCAA;5 1 (8) Under2 Coalition; 52 (9) US Climate Alliance; 5 3 (10) US Climate
Mayors; 54 and (11) We Are Still In.5 5 While not exhaustive, these examples are
representative of nonstate actors and initiatives, and help comprise-as of this
writing-8,237 municipalities in 128 countries making up 16 percent of the
world's population; 182 regions in 37 countries making up 15 percent of the
world's population; and 2,175 companies in 36 countries with US$21 trillion in
56
revenue.
These commitments and initiatives represent a dizzying array of diverse global
climate actions at varying scales of ambition and implementation. To name but a
handful of innovative examples: Seoul's building retrofit building programme; 57
the Lake Turkana wind power project; 58 the Pay As You Go (PAYG) solar systems project in East and West Africa; 59 Barcelona's people-focused Superblock
model; 60 Lagos's BRT "lite" bus system; 6 1 the Farm Animal Investment Risk
and Return (FAIRR) investor network; 62 OzHarvest, a Sydney-based surplus
food donor and delivery programme; 63 the Hydrogen Breakthrough Ironmaking
Technology (HYBRIT) public-private R&D joint venture; 64 and Tesco's multisolution logistical efficiency and modal shift strategy. 65 This list is merely suggestive; the world is awash in climate commitments, partnerships, and pilot
projects.
The most prominent nonstate-specifically, subnational-commitment is California's pledge, enacted into law in 2018, to require that 100 percent of the
state's electricity come from carbon-free sources by 2045. 66This pledge comple50 GLOBAL COVENANT OF MAYORS FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY,

https://www.globalcovenantofmay

ors.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).

51 Climate Action Overview, UNFCC, https://unfccc.int/climate-action (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
52 UNDER2 COALITION, https://www.theclimategroup.org/project/under2-coalition (last visited Jan.
11, 2019).
53 US CLIMATE ALLIANCE, https://www.usclimatealliance.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
54 US CLJMATF MAYORS, http://climatemayors.org/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
55 WE ARE STILL IN, https://www.wearestillin.com/ (last visited Jan. 11, 2019).
56 ANGEL Hsu Fr AL., GLOBAL CLIMATE ACTION OF REGIONS, STATES AND BUSINESSES 19-26 (2018),
datadriven.yale.edu/wp-content/.. ./08/YALE-NC1-PBLGlobal climateaction.pdf.
57 THE GLOBAL COMMISSION ON TE ECONOMY AND CLIMATE, UNLOCKING THE INCLUSIVE GROWTH
2
1ST CENTURY 52 (2018).

STORY OF TMe

58 Id. at 58.
59 Id. at 62.

60 Id. at 75.
61 Id. at 88.
62

Id. at 110.

63

Id. at 114.

64

Id. at 140.

Id. at 152.
Mark Chediak, California Governor Jerry Brown Signs Bill for Carbon-Free Power by 2045,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 24, 2018, 5:05 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-09-10/california
-s-brown-signs-bill-for-carbon-free-power-by-2045.
65

66
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ments California's cap-and-trade programme, the world's fourth-largest carbon
permit trading scheme (after the European Union, South Korea, and Guangdong,
China).67 This scheme, which applies to large electric power plants, industrial
fuel
plants, and fuel distributors, is connected to the California's low-carbon
68 and its subsidized zero-emissions electric vehicle programme. 6 9
standard
Corporate commitments have also attracted considerable attention in the postParis climate governance era. Among the most prominent of these is Walmart's
commitment to require its more than 10,000 suppliers-including thousands of
set of sustainability metrics ranging
Chinese companies-to report on a defined
70
from GHG emissions to food waste.
More generally, companies have to date reported 21,500 climate-related commitments to the Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP). 7 1 Of those, 81 percent included a quantifiable GHG emissions-reduction target, with 546 commitments
expressing an aspiration of carbon neutrality. 72 More than 200 of the world's
largest companies (as defined by the 2017 Forbes 2000 and Global 500 lists)
have made 3,755 unique emissions-reduction commitments. 73 Four-fifths
(17,955) of companies' commitments include specific base and target years, and
58 percent are short-term (pre-2020) commitments.7 4 Beyond GHG emissionreduction targets, 3,115 actions expressly address renewable energy in terms of
or at least
purchasing and generation. 75 Another 4,356 commitments discuss
76
commitment.
broader
a
of
part
a
as
energy
renewable
mention
In an analysis of these commitments' potential contribution to climate change
mitigation, Hsu and her colleagues found that if (1) these commitments are fully
implemented and (2) they do not slow the pace of climate action elsewhere, then
(3) these commitments would result in global GHG emissions of between 54.5 57.1 GtC0 2e/year in 2030. 77 This potential contribution, while not insignificant,
67 Understanding the California Cap and Trade, CENTER FOR CLIMATE AND ENERGY SOLUTIONS,

https://www.c2es.org/content/califomia-cap-and-trade/ (last visited Jan. 7, 2019).
68 About the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, CAL. ENERGY COMM'N, https://ww2.arb.ca.gov/our-work/
programs/low-carbon-fuel-standard/about.
69 See Nick Cahill, California to Spend $2.5B to Boost Zero-Emission Vehicle Sales, CoURTHOUSE
NEws SERV. (Jan. 26 2018), https://www.courthousenews.com/california-to-spend-2-5b-to-boost-zeroemission-vehicle-sales/.
70 See Press Release, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Walmart Announces New Commitments to Drive Sustainability Deeper Into the Company's Global Supply Chain (Oct. 25, 2012), https://www.prnews
wire.com/news-releases/walmart-announces-new-commitments-to-drive-sustainability-deeper-into-thecompanys-global-supply-chain- 175738411 .html; see also Alisha Staggs, An Up-close Assessment of
Walmart's SustainabilityIndex, GREENBIz (May 17, 2013), https://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2013/05/17/
up-close-assessment-walmarts-sustainability-index.
71 Hsu, supra note 56, at 23.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 26.
74 Id.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 8.
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is "still not nearly enough to hold global temperature increase to well below 2°C
and work towards limiting it to 1.50 C.1178
In a more ambitious scenario, wherein numerous national, regional, and local
governments cooperate with businesses and civil society partners across national
boundaries, GHG emissions in 2030 could be as much as one-third lower-15 to
23 GtC02e/year-than with fully-implemented national policies alone. 79 But even
under this unlikely scenario, global GHG emissions in 2030 would be between
36-43 GtC0 2e/year, potentially in excess of the amount associated with the Paris
Agreement target of holding warming to well below 2°C (40 GtC0 2e), and almost
assuredly in excess of the maximum amount associated with holding warming to
1.50 C (25-35GtCO2e/year).8 0
Moreover, it is reasonable to question whether those nonstate commitments
having quantifiable targets will in fact be fully implemented. To date, there is
very sparse data reported on their implementation and progress. 8 1 Previous analyses demonstrate that few voluntary corporate climate and sustainability domains
have established monitoring and reporting mechanisms. 82 Notwithstanding that
the commitments canvassed above are at an early stage of development, which
may partially account for their lack of reported implementation and monitoring
data thus far, the past performance of similar initiatives counsels skepticism. For
example, 10 years after the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development, 43
percent of the "Partnerships for Sustainable Development" formed pursuant to
the Summit did not yield results amenable to analysis and ultimate
83
accountability.
Paradoxically, after noting that the potential individual and cooperative contributions of these nonstate actors' commitments "should be interpreted with caution and uncertainty" 84 because of the unlikelihood of their complete
implementation and fulfillment, Hsu and her colleagues recommend collaboration "at all levels" 85 to realize the commitments' emissions-reduction potential.
Besides noting the role of financing in ensuring that sustainable development
partnerships are implemented, Hsu and her colleagues point to additional research suggesting "the role nationalgovernments can play in supporting and facilitating non-state actor initiatives through top-down policy support,
coordination among other subnational and non-state actors, and finance."' 86
78

Id.

79

Id. at 9.
IPCC, supra note 19, at 24.

80

81 Hsu, supra note 56, at 98.
82 See, e.g., Angel Hsu et al., Towards a New Climate Diplomacy, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 501,
501 (2015) [hereinafter New Climate Diplomacy]; Sander Chan et al., Effective and GeographicallyBalanced? An Output-basedAssessment of Non-state Climate Actions, 18 CLIMATE POL'Y 24, 24 (2018).
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This is not a little ironic given that the starting point of their analysis, like the
starting point of the post-Paris climate governance literature writ large, is the
contribution nonstate actors can make in order to fill the climate governance gap
created by weak national government actions: "Both individual commitments
made by regions, states, cities, businesses and international cooperative initiatives have the potential to reduce global greenhouse gas emissions beyond what
is currently expected from national policies alone." 87
This paradoxical call for states to support nonstate actors in order to fill the
gaps created by state inaction is not an isolated example. Rather, it is a recurring
feature of the nonstate actor climate governance narrative. In their book Climate
of Hope: How Cities, Businesses, and Citizens Can Save the Planet,88 former
New York City mayor Michael Bloomberg and former Sierra Club executive
director Carl Pope arrive at the same conclusion. After setting out the crucial role
of private investment in sustainable infrastructure, they proceed to note a series
of obstacles to attracting private investments: (1) infrastructure projects require
long-term investments that have solid but only moderate yields; (2) there is a
history in some jurisdictions of "unpredictable regulator intervention" in renewable energy developments, which are incorrectly perceived to be heavily subsidized; (3) many investors are not first-movers, and prefer to wait for decadeslong track records of investment returns; (4) not enough investment moves from
the global north to the global south; and (5) sustainable investments are typically
capital-intensive and thus expensive; and (6) "governments are still tilting in
favor of fossil fuels" (e.g. in 2014, global subsidies to the fossil fuels industry
were US$493 billion compared to US$120 billion to renewable energy companies, a four-to-one ratio). 89 According to Bloomberg and Pope, "[a]ddressing
such issues requires government leadership."90
It turns out that nonstate actors are not driving the bus toward climate mitigation after all. In light of the findings discussed above, reliance on nonstate commitments to lead efforts to enhance climate mitigation in the crucially-important
and potentially path-dependent short-term-let alone what little is left of the critical pre-2020 timeframe 9 1-is a highly questionable and quite possibly reckless
policy option. Rather, climate governance scholars and practitioners should redirect our attention back to national and international climate actors and actions
and attend to the root cause underlying the apparent failures of multilateralism
noted above. Below, the paper turns to this root problem and examines its implications for meaningful climate action across multiple levels of governance.
87 Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
88 MICHAEL BLOOMBERG & CAR1 POPE, CLIMATE

OF HOPE: How Crrris, BUSnESSES, AND CITIZENS

CAN SAVE THE PLANET (2017).
89 Id. at 191-93.
90 Id. at 192 (emphasis added).
91 On the critical importance of this timeframe, see Christiana Figueres et al., Three Years to Safeguard Our Climate, 546 NATURE 593, 593 (2017) (discussing recent climate modeling showing that if
GHG emissions do not begin to decline after 2020, the Paris Agreement targets become virtually
unattainable).
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IV.

Shall versus Should- Captured States

The turn away from state-focused, multilateral climate governance occurred
prior to the post-Paris era, and is more a response to the failure of the multilateral
climate negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009 than the latterly failures to date of
the Paris Agreement. Following two years of intensive multilateral negotiations,
the UNFCC COP15 meeting in Copenhagen was expected to result in a comprehensive and legally-binding climate treaty that would take effect after the expiry
of the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period in 2012. The outcome of these
negotiations, the Copenhagen Accord, was broadly considered a bitter failure.
During the final days of negotiations the early draft agreements calling for global
GHG emissions reductions of 50-80 percent by 2050 were unceremoniously
abandoned. Instead, COP15 concluded by "taking note" of a three-page, nonbinding political agreement-the Copenhagen Accord-that was drafted by a
group consisting of 28 heads of state during the final 24 hours of extended negotiations. 9 2 What had been hailed as "Hopenhagen" transmogrified into
"Brokenhagen." 9 3 Global climate governance had been thrown into a "crisis. '94
Following "Brokenhagen," climate governance scholarship and practice alike
began emphasizing the importance of nonstate and subnational actors' potential
to reinvigorate state-focused multilateralism, in effect diminishing-if not quite
demoting-the role of national governments: "In the post-Copenhagen era, the
nation-state and the state system seem to be enmeshed in cross-cutting webs of
governance that blur familiar boundaries and responsibilities between public and
'95
private sectors.
Now, in the post-Paris era, academic and activist claims about the importance
of nonstate actors' contributions to climate governance have only grown, seemingly exponentially, although not in response to any discernible increase in nonstate actors' climate governance capacity or contributions, but rather because
national governments are once again failing to reduce GHG emissions.
Pragmatic as this policy pivot may appear, it is important not to pass over the
causes of the inadequacy of state-focused multilateral climate governance. The
implications are not merely academic. It may well be that the barriers-whatever
they may be-to effective national- and international climate policymaking also
stand in the way of effective nonstate and subnational climate actions. 96 But there
is an even more direct and pressing rason to look more closely at the causes of
92 Karin Backstrand & Eva Lovbrand, Climate GovernanceAfter Copenhagen: Research Trends and
GOVERNANCE XVII (Karin Backstrand & Eva
Lvbrand eds., 2015).
93 Meinhard Doelle, The Legacy of the Climate Talks in Copenhagen: Hopenhagen or
Policy Practice, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMA-I

Brokenhagen?, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. R. 86, 86 (2010).
94 Jeffrey McGee, Minilateralism, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 132 (Karin

Baickstrand & Eva Lovbrand eds., 2015).
95 Backstrand & Lbvbrand, supra note 92, at xxii-xxiv.
96 For a brief and introductory discussion of politics as the defining characteristic of climate governance, no matter the level of governance in question, see Ian Bailey & Piers Revell, Re-politicizing Climate Governance Research, in RESEARCH HAND13OOK ON CLIMATE GOVERNANCE 534 (Karin BAckstrand

& Eva Lovbrand eds., 2015).
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inadequate national and international climate actions, which was introduced
above. Namely, notwithstanding the putative advantages of polycentric nonstate
and subnational climate actions (i.e. greater opportunities for experimentation
and learning coupled with increased communications and interactions across
more actors 97), theories and analyses of nonstate contributions to climate action
consistently call for their integration with-and support from-national
governments .98

Paradoxically again, academic commentary on the effectiveness of centrifugal
nonstate actions gestures back to centripetal national climate politics. For example, the proponents of a model capable of assessing and valuing the contributions
of nonstate and subnational actors observe that the challenge of decarbonization
is not limited to removing a set number of gigatonnes of carbon dioxide
equivalent from the atmosphere. Rather, decarbonization requires "disrupting
carbon lock-in through the wholesale transformation of established economic,
social, technological, and governance institutions." 99 Nonstate and subnational
climate actions must be assessed, accordingly, "against how much they contribute to broader transformations in key institutions."' 10
What does "carbon lock-in" mean, and what are its implications for climate
governance? A remarkable feature of the scholarly literature on climate governance is the sparse mention-let alone sustained analysis-of the outsize political
influence of carbon-intensive industries-particularly oil and gas-at the national and international level.10 1 While the world is decarbonizing faster than
ever, global GHG emissions continue to rise. 10 2 The reason why is perhaps deceptively simple, and has little to do with the surface-level failures of climate
multilateralism to solve the world's greatest collective action problem. According
to The Economist magazine, "[s]teel, cement, farming, transport and other forms
of economic activity account for over half of global carbon emissions. They are
technically harder to clean up than power generation and are protected by vested
97

See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, Advantages of a Polycentric Approach to Climate Change Policy, 5

114, 114 (2015); Andrew J. Jordan et al., Emergence of Polycentric Climate
Governance and Its Future Prospects, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 977, 977 (2015); Kenneth Shockley

NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE

& Idil Boran, With Waning US Leadership on Climate, Nonstate Actors to Play Outsize Role, THE CON23, 2016), https://theconversation.com/with-waning-us-leadership-on-climate-nonstateVERSATION (Nov.
actors-to-play-outsize-role-68946.
98 Hsu, supra note 56, at 1.
99 Hamish van der Ven, Steven Bernstein & Matthew Hoffman, Valuing the Contributionsof Nonstate and Subnational Actors to Climate Governance, 17 GLOBAL ENVTL. PoL. 1, 5 (2017).
100 Id.;See also Gregory C. Unruh, Understanding Carbon Lock-In, 28 ENERGY POL'Y 817, 817
(2000); Gregory C. Unruh, Escaping Carbon Lock-In, 30 ENERGY Poi'Y 317, 317 (2002); Jason
MacLean, Pipelinesand Paris?Canada'sClimate Policy Puzzle, 33 J. ENVTL.L. & PRAC. 45, 45 (2018).
101 See, e.g., Helen Thompson, OIL AND THE WESTERN ECONOMIC CRISIS 1 (2017). But see GuTSTEIN,
THE BIG STALL: How BIG OIL AND THINK TANKS ARE BLOCKING ACTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE IN
CANADA (2018); Jason MacLean, Striking at the Root Problem of Canadian EnvironmentalLaw: Identifying and Escaping Regulatory Capture, 29 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAC. 111, 111 (2016).
102 C0 2 Emissions from Fuel Combustion 2018 Overview, INT'L
www.iea.org/statistics/co2emissions/.
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industrialinterests."103 The political influence of the oil and gas industry in particular is the root cause of climate action inertia. Outside of the mainstream of
academic literature on climate governance, the perverse power of the special interests of the oil and gas industry is taken for granted. The international oil industry has played a fundamental role in shaping economic and political priorities and
policies in oil states, including the range of potential policies for environmental
protection. The industry as a whole, moreover, has shaped the recent history of
much of the world. Oil remains the single biggest component of the energy industry and the world's most traded commodity. 1°4 Half of the Global Fortune
500 top ten listed companies produces oil, and still-unlisted Saudi Aramco is
larger still.105 Oil literally fuels democracies and dictatorships alike, and oil's
products fuel over 90% of the world's transport." °6
Thus, one of the leading analyses of the failed legacy of climate multilateralism notes, almost as an analytic afterthought, that "[t]he United States, especially, has not been inclined to provide leadership, given its dependence on fossil
fuels. Large developing countries have also consistently signaled that they prioritize development goals over climate protection." 10 7 Yet this is the story underlying the failures of state-focused multilateralism: states' consistent and unabated
prioritization of economic development and the special corporate interests in economic development. Private industry organizations-themselves a kind of nonstate actor-have throughout the relatively short history of multilateral climate
governance lobbied repeatedly and successfully against mandating specific,
quantifiable GHG emissions-reduction targets, advocating instead for marketbased mechanisms and voluntary corporate self-regulation. 10 8 By paying scant
attention to this underlying story, the nonstate governance literature runs the risk
identified early on by van Asselt of ignoring the politics and competing interests
among nonstate climate governance commitments and actions. 109 Not all nonstate actors or actions are created equally (investor-owned multinational oil majors are nonstate actors), and ignoring the politics of power may result in
overstating the climate mitigation potential of nonstate actions and obscuring the
ways nonstate actions might influence national and/or international climate
actions.
103 The World is Losing the War Against Climate Change, THmECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2018), https://
www.economist.com/leaders/20 18/08/02/the-world-is-losing-the-war-against-climate-change (emphasis
added).
104 Special Report: Oil: Breaking the Habit, THE
ECONOMIST
(Nov. 26 2016), http://
www.economist.com/sites/default/files/20161126_oil.pdf.
105 Id.
Id.
Hoffman, supra note 37, at 15.
108 See Gutstein, supra note 101, 51-63 (a discussion of such efforts on the part of the Global Climate
Coalition, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development, the International Chamber of Commerce, and the American Petroleum Institute).
109 Harro van Asselt, Climate Governance at the Crossroads:Experimenting with a Global Response
After Kyoto, 2 ENVTI,. Poi. 354, 355 (2013); Harro van Asselt et al., Global Climate Governance after
Paris: Setting the Stage for Experimentation, in INNOVATING CI.IMATE GovERNANCE: MovING BEYOND
106
107

ExPERIMENTS
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Consider a brief example. In 2018 a nonprofit organization called the Climate
Leadership Council represented by two former U.S. Senators turned oil and gas
industry lobbyists proposed a federal carbon fee and dividend of US$40 per
tonne. 110 On its own, this price point would be insufficient to reduce GHG emissions in line with the United States' GHG-reduction commitments under the
Paris Agreement (from which it is withdrawing), I' but it would still be considered a good start, and far better than no price at all. As part of this proposal, the
lobbyists pledged the support of key nonstate actors, including major investorowned oil companies including ExxonMobil, BP, Royal Dutch Shell, and Total
SA. But the Senators-turned-lobbyists did not simply propose a carbon fee. Instead, they proposed a compromise: a federal carbon fee in exchange for (1) the
outright repeal of the Obama-era Clean Power Plan, which authorizes the federal2
Environmental Protection Agency to regulate and reduce carbon emissions;"
and (2) a grant of federal- and state-level immunity to GHG emitters from tort
liability for their contributions to climate change and its costs. This would effectively reverse the polluter-pays principle and shift the financial burden of adaptestimated as being in the trillions of
ing to climate change (the costs of which are113
dollars) from private emitters to the public.
In response to environmentalists' criticisms, 114 particularly the counterargument that there is no necessary connection between a carbon fee, on the one
hand, and a waiver of liability for fossil fuels companies on the other," 5 a U.S.
Congressman spoke out in favour of the proposed deal. The congressman's rhetoric is instructive. First, in an attempt to diminish criticism of major oil companies, he stated that "beating up on them" makes for "cheap applause."' 16 He also
characterized tort liability. lawsuits against oil companies (which are presently
being filed and litigated in courts across the United States) as unlikely to succeed
110 Trent Lott & John Breaux, Here's How to Break the Impasse on Climate, N.Y. TrMEs (June 20,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/20/opinion/climate-change-fee-carbon-dioxide.html.
I For a comprehensive analysis of carbon pricing levels in relation to GHG emissions reduction
targets, see Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, Report of the High-Level Commission on Carbon Pricing, THE WORLD BANK GROUP (May 29, 2017), https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/54ff9c5ce4bO
See also
a53decccfb4c/t/59b7f2409f8dce5316811916/1505227332748/CarbnPricing-FullReport.pdf.
R.S. Tol, The Social Cost of Carbon, 3 ANN. REV. ECON. 419 (2011) (recommending a carbon price of
US$70). On this latter point, see MARK JACCARD, MIKELA HEIN & TwFFANY VASS, IS Win-Win Possible?
Canada's Government Achieve Its Paris Commitment. . .and Get Re-Elected 1 (2016), http:/Irem-

main.rem.sfu.ca/papers/jaccard/Jaccard-Hein-Vass%20CdnClimatePol%20EMRG-REM-SFU%2OSep
%2020%202016.pdf.
112 See What is the Clean Power Plan?, NAT. RESOURCES DEF. COUNCIL (Sept. 29, 2017), https://

www.nrdc.org/stories/how-clean-power-plan-works-and-why-it-matters.
113 James Hansen et al., Young People's Burden: Requirement of Negative CO2 Emissions, 8 EARTH
Sys. DYNAMICS 577, 592 (2017).
114 See, e.g., Lee Wasserman & David Kaiser, Beware of Oil Companies Bearing Gifts, N.Y. TIMES

(July 25, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/25/opinion/carbon-tax-lott-breaux.html.
115 Id.
116 Scott Peters, Time for a Carbon Tax, N.Y. TimFis (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/
08/03/opinionletters/carbon-tax-litigation-oil-companies.html (Peters, a California Democrat, is as of
this writing a member of the U.S. House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Energy, and of the
bipartisan Climate Solutions Caucus).
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or have any effect on carbon emissions. 1 7 Most tellingly, the congressman argued that getting the oil companies to "acquiesce" to a carbon fee might assist in
enacting the fee into law, and if that means giving up on a few "long-shot lawsuits," America should cut that deal today. 11 8 It appears not to occur to this congressman to challenge the outsize regulatory influence wielded by the fossil fuels
industry; rather, he treats the industry almost as if it were sovereign. As such, no
climate policy without its approval is even thinkable, let alone feasible. This example illustrates not only the subsisting power of the oil and gas industry over
U.S. climate policy, 1 9 but also the conceptual danger of treating and valorizing
all nonstate climate actors and actions equally. It also further develops the point
raised above about the questionable merits of relying on nonstate actors for climate policy leadership. The irony inherent in that logic is illustrated further
through an examination of one of the most prominent corporate climate initiatives, "The B Team," 120 to which the paper now turns.
V.

Plan B- Corporate Social Responsibility, Redux

Former UN Secretary-General special envoy on climate change Mary Robinson describes the "B Team" as an initiative that brings together a growing number of business leaders around the world (co-founded by Sir Richard Branson of
the Virgin Group and Jochen Zeitz of the Zeitz Foundation) committed to "delivering a new way of doing business that prioritises people and the planet alongside
profit-a 'Plan B' for business." 1 2 1
Plan B is admirably candid-if still somewhat coy-about the rationale for
greater business involvement in climate governance: "Civil Society alone cannot
solve the tasks at hand and many governments are unwilling or unable to act.
While there are myriad reasons we've arrived at this juncture, much of the blame
rests with the principles and practices of 'business as usual.' "122
Plan B's advocacy efforts follow two separate but closely related tracks: (1)
persuading other businesses to implement sustainable practices; and (2) lobbying
governments to enact stronger business regulations, including, tellingly, lobbying
against other forms of corporate regulatory lobbying.
The first track is effectively a repackaged form of corporate social responsibility (CSR): "Leading by example, and leveraging our collective voice, we are part
of a growing movement of businesses who want to be part of the solution rather
Id.
118 Id.
117

119 See The Editorial Board, Midterm Climate Report: Partly Cloudy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/1 1/09/opinion/climate-change-midterm-elections.html (Examples of this
influence abound and include the role of the industry's campaigning against state-level legislative initiatives such as Washington State's proposal to enact a carbon price and Arizona's proposal to set binding
renewable energy targets. This campaign is discussed further below).
120 THE B TE,, http://www.bteam.org/ (last visited Jan. 12, 2019).
121 MARY ROBINSON, CLIMATE JUSTICE: HOPE, REsn.IENCE, AND THE FIGHT FOR A SUSTAINABiF
TURE
122
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than a substantial contributor to the problem." 123 Laudable as this effort may be,
the evidence canvassed in the previous section above suggests that this voluntary
approach to greater corporate responsibility and sustainability is insufficient.
Moreover, multijurisdictional comparative analysis of the barriers to environmental corporate sustainability demonstrates that leaving corporate sustainability
to market forces (e.g. investor and consumer demands) or business itself through
voluntary CSR initiatives has not succeeded in transforming commitments and
pledges into genuinely sustainable results. 124 The primacy of shareholder valuemaximization remains deeply entrenched and largely immune from competing
CSR norms, including enhanced transparency and reporting practices. 125 Moreover, CSR's defining feature-volunteerism-is routinely deployed as a strategic
means of resisting legislative mandates. 1 26 As The Global Commission on the
Economy and Climate concludes its 2018 report on accelerating climate action:
"What is currently lacking is sufficient political and business leadership."127
This twofold lack of leadership is not coincidental.
Fittingly, Plan B's second track of advocacy seeks to directly address this joint
lack of leadership: "We act as a countervailing force to others lobbying to derail
effort to protect the planet and its inhabitants. We push the agenda. We don't
we work with civil
wait for government regulations to force us to act. Instead,
128
society to advocate for enabling policy environments".
Specifically, The B Team has since 2013 advocated for stronger national government policies (e.g. the U.S. Clean Power Plan and U.K/ net-zero legislation);
it joined the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition with 21 governments and 90
businesses; and it became a member of Friends of the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform. 129 Six years later, however, the U.S. Clean Power Plan is under review and
in jeopardy of being rescinded; 130 carbon prices across enacting jurisdictions remain far below the level required to meet the world's GHG emissions-reduction
The B Team Progress Report June 2013 - June 2015: Towards a Plan B for Business, THE B
(June 2016), https://issuu.com/the-bteam/docs/b-team-progress-report_2016/21?e=15214291/
36892582 [hereinafter B Team Progress Report].
Beate Sjtfjel & Irene Lynch Fannon, Corporate Sustainability:Gender as an Agent for
124 See, e.g.,
Change, in CREAT1NG CORPORATE SUSTAINAB1LITY: GENDER AS AN AGENT FOR CHANGE 305, 315-16.
(Beate Sjdfjell & Irene Lynch Fannon eds., 2018).
125 Beate Sj~fjell & Irene Lynch Fannon, supra note 124, at 315. See also Beate SjMfjell et al., Shareholder Primacy: The Main Barrierto Sustainable Companies, in COMPANY LAW AND SUSTAINABILITY 79
(Beate Sjifjell & B.J. Richardson eds., 2015).
Irene Lynch Fannon, The CorporateSocial Responsibility Movement and Law's Empire:
126 See, e.g.,
Is There a Conflict?, 58 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 1 (2007); Jason MacLean, Review of Penelope Simons &
Audrey Macklin, The Governance Gap: Extractive Industries, Human Rights, and the Home State Advantage, 3 THE EXTRACTION INDUS. AND Soc'Y 262 (2016).
123

TEAM

127
Tnr

Tr

GLOB. COMM'N ON THE ECON. AND CLIMATE, UNLOCKING THE INCLUSIVF GROWrH STORY OF

21ST CENTURY: ACCELERATING CLIMATE ACTION IN URGENT TIrMES 16 (2018).
128 B Team Progress Report, supra note 123, at 3.
129

Id. at 13.

130 Complying with President Trump's Executive Order on Energy Independence, EPA (June 18,
2018), https://www.epa.gov/energy-independence.
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and climate stabilization goals;13 I and both national and subnational governments
continue to heavily subsidize fossil fuels, especially oil and gas; the true amount
of those subsidies after factoring in undercharging for environmental costs and
general taxes as well as production costs would have amounted to US$5.3 trillion
in 2015 (or 6.5 percent of global gross domestic product). 132 Progressive corporate lobbying targeting perverse corporate lobbying thus far appears to have
failed to help establish enabling policy environments. Notably, the sticky nature
of perverse policies applies not only to national governments, but also to subnational ones, including putative climate leaders such as California. As Bloomberg
and Pope acknowledge, "[1]obbying is a $3 billion industry in Washington
alone-and that's not counting the lobbying that goes on in state capitals and city
33
halls."1

Part V:

California Dreaming- Captured Substates

As discussed above, California is widely perceived to be a leading example of
the climate governance capacity of subnational actors. But while California has
concentrated on reducing state-level fossil fuels consumption, it has not addressed its increasing extraction and production of oil and gas. Since 2011, the
state has issued permits for 20,000 new oil and gas wells; over 8,500 of those
wells are situated within a half-mile of residential communities, including homes,
34
schools, and hospitals.'
In a letter to California's governor signed by 26 climate change scholars calling for California to phase-out its existing oil and gas wells and to cease issuing
permits allowing new oil and gas extraction, the climate scholars noted that at
least 75 percent of California's oil and gas is as carbon-intensive as Canada's tar
sands bitumen crude, considered the most corrosive and carbon-intensive in the
world. 13 5 Accordingly, if California were to phase-out its existing wells while
prohibiting new extraction, the state could prevent the emission of an estimated
428 million cubic metric tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent between 2019 and
2030, the equivalent of California's annual economy-wide GHG emissions in
131 Few Countries Are Pricing Carbon High Enough to Meet Climate Targets, ORG. OF ECON. CoOPERATION AND DEV. (Sept. 18, 2018), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/tax-policy/few-countries-are-pricing-

carbon-high-enough-to-meet-climate-targets.htm.
132 David Coady et al., How Large are Global Fossil Fuel Subsidies?, 91 GLoB. DEv. 11, 11-27
(2017).
133 BLOOMBERG & PoPE, supra note 88, at 249.

134 Steven C. Amstrup, PhD, Chief Scientist, Polar Bears International, to Edmund G. Brown, Governor of California (July 12, 2018) (on file with Center for Biological Diversity), https://
www.biologicaldiversity.org/programs/climate law-institute/energy-and-global-warming/pdfs/18-0712-Scientist-letter-to-Gov-Brown-calling-for-phase-out-of-oil-and-gas-production.pdf. See also Kate
Wheeling, Climate Scientists Call for Jerry Brown to End Oil Extraction in California, PACIFIC STANDARD (July 12, 2018), https://psmag.conenvironment/climate-scientists-call-on-jerry-brown-to-end-oilextraction-in-california; Kate Wheeling & Jim Morris, Big Oil's Black Mark on California's Climate
Record, PACIFIC STANDARD (Sept. 12, 2018), https://psmag.com/environment/big-oils-black-mark-oncalifornias-climate-record.
135 Id. See also Judith Lewis Mernit, Why Does Green California Pump the Dirtiest Oil in the U.S.?,
YALE ENV'T 360 (Oct. 19, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/why-does-green-california-pump-thedirtiest-oil-in-the-u-s.
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2015.136 By contrast, the climate scholars warned that "[n]ew approvals of fossil
fuel infrastructure projects such as pipelines, marine and rail import/export terminals, and refinery expansions further exacerbate 'carbon lock-in' because such
projects require up-front investment, incentivizing continued operation for decades into the future." 137 The scholars concluded that "[a]n end to new fossil fuel
projects is urgently needed to meet the Paris Agreement goals to limit global
average temperature rise to well below 2 degrees Celsius and strive to limit temperature rise below 1.5 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels." 138 Califorexisting oil and gas extraction
nia, however, presently has no plan to phase-out139
projects.
new
of
approval
the
restrict
or
projects
California is not alone among subnational actors captured by the fossil fuels
industry's opposition to stringent climate policies. In Washington State, for instance, BP, Valero, Phillips 66, and other fossil fuels interests spent over US$30
million to help oppose the state's 2018 ballot initiative to impose the first carbon
price in the United States. According to The New York Times, "[b]ackers of the
proposal hoped it would serve as a template for similar action elsewhere and
perhaps for the country as a whole."' 140 But even a state as reliably democratic as
Washington succumbed to what The New York Times characterized as the fossil
fuels industry's "relentless fearmongering about job losses, higher electricity bills
and more expensive gasoline." 14 1 The ballot initiative was defeated resoundingly.
As Bloomberg and Pope acknowledge, "special interests in other countries are
acting in the same way as special interests in the United States, clinging to their
privileges, monopolies, and market positions. Logging interests in Peru, coal interests in Australia, cattle interests in Brazil, owners of outmoded merchant
ships-all try to slow progress toward a cleaner world by extracting political
concessions from governments." 1 42 Trying and succeeding. Several Canadian
provinces, for example, have themselves have mounted a concerted oppositionincluding legal challenges-to the Canadian federal government's proposed (and
modest, starting at CDN$20 per tonne) national carbon price. 143 The provinces'
opposition is being fueled by the nonrenewable energy industry's opposition to
legally-binding climate change policies. 144 Subnational governments are no less
136 Id.
137 Id. at 2.
138 Id.

at 1.

139 Id.

140 Opinion, Midterm Climate Report: Partly Cloudy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2018), https://www.ny-

times.com/20l 8/11/09/opinion/climate-change-midterm-elections.html.
141 Id. See also Our Coalition, No ON 1631, https://votenoonl631.com/our-coalition/.
142 BLOOMBERG & POPE, supra note 88, at 254.

143 See, e.g., Jason MacLean, The problem with Canada's gradual climate policy, POLICY OPnONS
POLITIQUES (Oct. 26, 2018), http://policyoptions.irpp.org/magazines/october-2018/the-problem-withcanadas-gradual-climate-policy/.
144 See, e.g., Jason MacLean, Kill Bill C-69 - It Undermines Efforts to Tackle Climate Change, THE
CONVFRSAIION (Oct. 25, 2018), https://research.usask.ca/our-impact/highlights/the-conversation-canada/
kill-bill-c-69-it-undermines-efforts-to-tackle-climate-change-.php.
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immune than are national governments to regulatory capture by the special interests of the fossil fuels industry.
Moreover, climate governance's root problem of regulatory capture is an enduring one that threatens to imperil the progress otherwise being made in the
generation of renewable energy throughout the world. Once again, Bloomberg
and Pope acknowledge that, notwithstanding the fact that the under-subsidized
costs of renewable energy are often cheaper than fossil fuels, the fossil fuels
industry "will hold on for as long as they can, and many will succeed in extending their profitability far longer than the market would naturally allow."' 14 5
Indeed, as long as regulatory incentives favor continued production, fossil fuel
producers will both exploit their reserves rapidly and continue exploration activities, in direct conflict with other state and nonstate efforts to mitigate climate
change.146 Low fossil fuel prices, moreover, may reflect the intention of producer
countries like Canada, Russia, the United States, and OPEC members to "sell
out" their reserves by maintaining or even increasing production despite declining demand for fossil fuel assets. 147 Relatedly, if oil and gas producers become
concerned by the prospect of either the gradual or more imminent greening of
economic policies in response to the targets set by Paris Agreement, they may
well extract their stocks more rapidly, thus accelerating global warming. 1 48
Meanwhile, as Bloomberg and Pope observe, fossil fuels interests will continue to vigorously oppose regulatory reforms, including ending fossil fuels subsidies and pricing carbon and other forms of pollution, which would if
implemented allow for increased investments in "natural commons and public
goods". 149 How to break this policy impasse? As if speaking for much of the
nonstate climate governance literature, Bloomberg and Pope offer the following
declaration, which merits quotation in full:
The single most important development in the fight against climate change
hasn't been the Paris Agreement, of the U.S. shale gas boom, or even the advancement of solar and battery technology. All have been critically important.
But the most important has been that mayors, CEOs, and investors increasingly
look at climate change not as a political issue but as a financial and economic
one-and they recognize that there are gains to be made, and losses to be
averted, by factoring climate change into the way they manage their cities, busi150
nesses, and funds.
& POPE, supra note 88, at 254.
Saphira A.C. Rekker et al., Comparing Extraction Rates of Fossil Fuel ProducersAgainst Global
Climate Goals, 8 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 489, 489 (2018).
147 Jean-Francois Mercure et al., Macroeconomic Impact of Stranded Fossil Fuel Assets, 8 NATURE
CLIMAT : CHANGE 588, 588 (2018). See also Julie Gordon, Imperial Oil to Build New Oil Sand Project,
REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imperial-oil-aspen/imperial-oil-to-buildnew-canada-oil-sand-project-idUSKCN1NC010; Al Root, Why Oil Stocks Could Get a Boost from
OPEC Production Cuts, BARRON'S (Nov. 12, 2018), https://www.barrons.com/articles/why-oil-stockscould-get-a-boost-from-opec-production-cuts- 1542024900.
148 Hans Werner Sinn, Public Policies Against Global Warming: A Supply Side Approach, 15 INT'L.
TAX & PUB. FrN. 360, 360-394 (2008).
149 BLOOMBERG & POPE, supra note 88, at 254.
150 Id. at 199 (emphasis added).
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And yet, time and again, Bloomberg and Pope, not unlike so much of the
nonstate climate governance literature, fall back on the indispensable role of nathese
tional governments, whose "[p]olitical leadership is essential to deploy
15 1
need."
we
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scale
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speed
the
with
ideas
investment]
[sustainable
VI.

Conclusion- Readjusting the Rearview Mirror Back to Plan A

Driving may be difficult when it is dark outside, but a science that tries to see
the road ahead by using only the rearview mirror makes little sense, especially if
we are building the road as we go along.
15 2
-Alexander Wendt
There is a tension in the literature of international law and policymaking with
respect to the question of institutional design. Positive analyses that proffer explanations of past practices cannot in themselves direct future choices, or the
goals that international policymakers ought to pursue. Such questions are normative, and intensely political. On the other hand, in the absence of positive theory,
norm entrepreneurs may envisage and pursue utopian prescriptions whose fail1 53
ures may be worse than comparatively more realistic, "second-best" policies.
As is well known, the historian E.H. Carr criticized utopian theories unconditioned by political constraints for "ignor[ing] what was in contemplation of what
should be." 154 By examining the past effectiveness (or lack thereof) of institutional designs and policy choices, we can better understand why some choices
worked and others not, and that understanding can inform the next choices we
make.
While the international relations theorist Alexander Wendt worried that navigating by such past positive explanations alone is tantamount to trying to drive
by using only the rearview mirror, 155 the present impasse in international climate
governance raises a different concern. Our task is to reorient our rearview mirror
to better reflect the causes of past failures so as to avoid repeating them.
Much international-cum-global climate governance theory suggests that states
and state-focused multilateralism have failed to produce meaningful climate mitigation. This is doubtless true. But the root causes of that failure are not inherent
in either states themselves or the negotiations among states. The root cause, the
outsize political influence of special interests, principally the fossil fuels industry,
infects not only states and their multilateral negotiations but also the initiatives of
subnational and other nonstate actors that the climate governance literature con151
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siders to be our best hope of closing the gap between the aspirations and the
actions of national governments under international agreements. The evidence
canvassed above demonstrates this. Climate actors at all levels of governance are
subject to and limited by the interference of this incredibly influential industry.
Our rearview mirror, properly oriented, tells us that we have been here before.
Critics of top-down, command-and-control environmental regulations at the nation-state level beginning in the 1980s have ascribed the shortcomings of such
regulations to the nature of the nation-state itself. Indeed, this narrative about the
inherently cumbersome and costly nature of top-down environmental regulations
appears to have lost none of its normative purchase. 156 The at once theoretical
and practical risk we run now is to transpose the putatively inherent limitations of
domestic top-down environmental regulatory regimes onto the international
level, and thereby suppose that multilateralism is inherently deficient and that our
best hope for effective global climate governance resides in promoting a diffuse,
polycentric, and voluntary regime of nonstate climate actions. As discussed
above, the early evidence suggests that this approach is proving no more successful than state-focused multilateralism.
The argument advanced here, however, is not a paean to nationalism, although
as much of the nonstate climate governance literature unwittingly testifies, the
state remains the critical climate actor on the world's stage. Nor is it to dismiss
that, in the post-Paris climate era, we need "all hands on deck." The argument,
rather, is that for multilevel climate governance to succeed, it must at multiple
levels of governance address and effectively counter the powerful and perverse
influence of the fossil fuels industry.
This may be how nonstate actors can make their most significant contribution
to enhancing climate governance, by collaborating to directly counter the fossil
fuels industry's capture of climate policies and regulations. But as the B Team's
lack of success in its own anti-lobbying lobbying campaign testifies, this is no
mean task. A critical first step is to resist the blurring of familiar boundaries and
responsibilities between public and private sectors occasioned by the proliferation of nonstate climate governance actors and their pronouncements,1 57 and to
rehabilitate Plan A, effective national governance. The Economist may have put
it best when it observed in an early special report on CSR that "[a]bove all, it is
governments, not firms, that should arbitrate between interest groups for the pub156 See, e.g., Daniel C. Esty, Red Lights to Green Lights: From 20th Century EnvironmentalRegulation to 21st Century Sustainability,47 ENVT'L L. 53, 53-80 (2017). Indeed, Esty treats the phenomenon
of regulatory capture almost as an analytic and regulatory afterthought, observing that "[o]f course, privileged access to decision makers by special interests-through lobbyists, think-tank funding, and campaign contributions-will need to be monitored and controlled, perhaps with disclosure rules and
transparency tools that flag attempts to torque the outcome of decision processes." Would that it were so
simple! See, e.g., LAWRENCE LEssic, THE USA is LESTERLAND (Createspace), (2014). See also NAOMI
ORESKFS & ERIK M.

CONWAY, THE COI.APSE OF WESTERN CIVUIIZATION:

A ViFW FROM THE FUTURE

54-55 (2014) (describing the "carbon combustion complex," or the "interlinked fossil fuel extraction,
refinement, and combustion industries, financiers, and government 'regulatory' agencies that enabled and
defended destabilization of the world's climate in the name of employment, growth, and prosperity").
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of it."'

It is the job of governments to govern; don't let them wiggle out
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